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PROTECTING THE ANTITERRORISM
TOOLS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS: LIMITING
THE APPLICATION OF DAIMLER’S “ATHOME” TEST
ALEXIS CASAMASSIMA†
INTRODUCTION
One morning, a father leaves for work, a mother prepares for a
holiday meal, a brother shovels snow from the sidewalk, a
teenager anticipates a reunion with a sister, daughters wave
goodbye to their parents. It is pretty much a typical American
day in a typical American life.
But then something happens that forever changes this life. Life
will never be the same again. A terrorist, for reasons nobody
understands, for reasons beyond the concept of humanity, blows
a plane out of the air or hijacks a ship or shoots a father,
murders a wife, husband, sister, or brother.1

“Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat [of] violence by
individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social
objective through the intimidation of a large audience, beyond
that of the immediate victims.2” Throughout the past three
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1
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts & Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1 (1990)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley).
2
Todd Sandler, The Analytical Study of Terrorism: Taking Stock, 51 J. PEACE
RES. 257 (2014). It is difficult to uniformly define the term “terrorism” because its
meaning varies in different countries. This is the precise reason why the United
Nations has struggled and has never actually defined the term. U.N. 101: There Is
No UN Definition of Terrorism, HUMAN RIGHTS VOICES, http://www.humanrights
voices.org/eyeontheun/un_101/facts/?p=61 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).

1115

1116

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1115

decades, terrorism radically evolved in terms of who is carrying
out the attacks, why, and how.3 The 2015 Global Terrorism
Index reported the total number of deaths from terrorism to be
the greatest in history and found that terrorism is impacting
Despite these shocking
more countries than ever before.4
numbers, deaths related to domestic terrorism have not sharply
increased as compared to international terrorism.5
Twenty-five years ago, United States Congress recognized
two distinct principles regarding terrorism. First, Congress
recognized the imperative role money plays: “[Funding] is the
oxygen of terrorism.”6 Without funding, terrorists cannot build
an organizational structure to carry out attacks.7 Second,
Congress acknowledged the lack of tools American citizens have
available in fighting international terrorism through financial
recovery for injuries caused by terrorist groups.
In pursuit of these goals, Congress granted Americans,
acting in their individual capacity, the right to bring civil actions
against those responsible for terrorist acts through the AntiTerrorism Act of 1992 (“ATA”).8 In enacting this law, Congress
provided a new mode to deprive terrorists of money while
bringing justice to Americans harmed by international terrorism.
3
The forms of terrorism we witness today, we could not have envisioned thirty
years ago. The National Security Research Division has studied this evolution and
analyzed modern terrorism trends: (1) terrorism has become bloodier; (2) terrorists
have developed new financial resources; (3) terrorists have evolved new models of
organization; and (4) terrorists have exploited new communication technologies.
Brian Michael Jenkins, The New Age of Terrorism, in The McGraw-Hill Homeland
Security Handbook 117–18 (2006).
4
INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2015: MEASURING AND
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM 9 (2015) (“The total number of deaths
from terrorism in 2014 reached 32,685, constituting an 80 per cent increase from
18,111 the previous year.”).
5
Id. (“Attacks in Western countries accounted for a small percentage incidents,
representing 4.4 per cent of terrorist incidents and 2.6 per cent of deaths over the
last 15 years.”).
6
Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Remarks to Executives Club of Chicago
Leadership Symposium, Impact of Global Terrorism (Mar. 14, 2002), http://20012009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/8839.htm.
7
Gerald P. O’Driscoll et al., Stopping Terrorism: Follow the Money, HERITAGE
FOUND.: HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 25, 2001), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2001/09/stopping-terrorism-follow-the-money (“Terrorism is a business the fruits of
which are nurtured by . . . financial flows. Cut off these flows, and the terrorist’s
activities will be stunted no matter how fanatical the devotion of their followers.”).
8
The ATA was originally enacted in 1990, but due to a procedural error, the Act
was repealed and later reenacted in 1992. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012); Licci v.
Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 68 n.19 (2d Cir. 2012).
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Throughout the last two decades, Americans have pursued
damages under the Act and brought numerous types of terrorist
actors to justice, including third-party actors like corporations,
financial institutions, and quasi-government entities. In these
actions, courts have allowed American plaintiffs to hold third
parties liable when there was a showing of material support.9
Nonetheless, as a result of a recent United States Supreme
Court precedential case, the practice of bringing foreign sponsors
of terrorism into U.S. jurisdictions has been called into question.
In 2015, plaintiffs in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (“S.D.N.Y.”) won a $655.5 million
verdict against the Palestine Liberation Organization under the
ATA’s civil provision.10 Plaintiff’s victory was achieved in light of
the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Daimler AG v. Bauman,
where the Court imposed a new, stricter standard on federal
courts attempting to exercise general jurisdiction over foreign
individuals and corporate defendants.11 The S.D.N.Y. found that
Daimler did not preclude personal jurisdiction in exceptional
cases involving acts of terror.12 However, this decision was
recently overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.13 The Second Circuit adopted a position endorsed
by several cases coming out of the District Court for the District
of Columbia (“D.D.C.”), which have all ruled that federal courts
can no longer exercise jurisdiction over foreign sponsors of
terrorism as a result of Daimler.14
This Note argues that courts should not apply the Daimler
general jurisdiction standard to defendants in ATA civil
proceedings, because (1) it was not intended to insulate certain
9
But see Alison Bitterly, Note, Can Banks Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting
Terrorism?: A Closer Look into the Split on Secondary Liability Under the
Antiterrorism Act, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3391 (2015) (noting that the circuits
are in disagreement over whether secondary liability should extend to third parties
indirectly involved with the carrying out of terrorist attacks).
10
Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org. (Sokolow IV), No. 04 CIVIL 00397
(GBD), 2015 WL 10852003, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2015), vacated, Waldman v.
Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016); see also 18. U.S.C. § 2333(a)
(2012) (allowing for treble damages).
11
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014).
12
Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org. (Sokolow III), No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD),
2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).
13
Waldman, 835 F.3d 317.
14
Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth. (Klieman II), 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246
(D.D.C. 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 31 (D.D.C. 2015);
Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 49 (D.D.C. 2015).
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foreign terrorist sponsors from these actions and (2) applying
Daimler would seriously undermine the purpose of the ATA’s
civil provision.15 Part I surveys the jurisdictional requirements
that must be satisfied to bring foreign defendants into federal
court. Part II discusses the position of various courts on the
issue of whether foreign defendants in ATA civil actions can be
subject to the federal jurisdiction on the basis of Daimler’s
standards. Part III urges the Supreme Court to exempt ATA
civil actions from Daimler’s standard to ensure that Americans
can continue bringing such suits against sponsors of terrorism.
Finally, Part IV explains why Daimler cannot apply to foreign
defendants in ATA civil actions without creating virtual
immunity for certain classes of terrorist sponsors and
undermining the purposes of the ATA.
I. ACQUIRING FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
DEFENDANTS WHO ALLEGEDLY SPONSOR TERRORISM
Foreign defendants can only be brought into federal court
when the court can properly exercise jurisdiction over them.16 To
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, the plaintiff has
the burden of establishing both personal jurisdiction over the
defendant and subject-matter jurisdiction over the cause of
action.17 Personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.18 The breadth of personal jurisdiction
allowed by the Due Process Clause has been a long-standing
issue in federal jurisprudence, but the United States Supreme
Court recently attempted to resolve this uncertainty by creating
a definitive test.19 In contrast, through its constitutional grant of
power, Congress can create subject-matter jurisdiction by passing
federal legislation to provide Article III courts the authority to

15
In articulating this argument, this Note focuses on the application of
Daimler’s ruling to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, a foreign quasigovernment, unincorporated entity.
16
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(2).
17
See id.; Jason A. Yonan, Note, An End to Judicial Overreaching in
Nationwide Service of Process Cases: Statutory Authorization To Bring Supplemental
Personal Jurisdiction Within Federal Courts’ Powers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 557, 559
(2002).
18
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011).
19
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 756–57 (2014).
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hear specific issues.20 For example, by enacting the ATA,
Congress authorized the courts to hear matters arising out of
acts of international terrorism.21
A.

Evolution of Personal Jurisdiction in the United States

United States Supreme Court precedent for the
requirements of personal jurisdiction to satisfy due process has
evolved for nearly two centuries. Personal jurisdiction was first
articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff22 in which the Court took a strict
territorial approach. Under this approach, the Court interpreted
due process to allow a defendant to be subject to state court
authority only if (1) he was served notice within the state, or
(2) through a proceeding against instate property the defendant
owned.23 However, this standard became frustrated with an
evolving American society.24 Advances in technology made it
easier for defendants to be transient between states and, thus,
made it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to locate and serve
defendants within state lines.25
The Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington
recognized and resolved the issue of taking a strict territorial
approach to personal jurisdiction by broadening its interpretation
of due process.26 In determining the scope of the Due Process
Clause, the Court declared that personal jurisdiction could be
satisfied by either specific or general jurisdiction.27 Specific
jurisdiction arose when the defendant’s conduct in the state gave
rise to the cause of action.28 General jurisdiction, however,
allowed for nonresident defendants to be haled into court for
conduct occurring outside the state. For causes of actions arising
outside the state, a foreign defendant could be subject to
20

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; Id. art. III, § 1.
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).
22
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
23
Id. at 724.
24
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (“In the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, changes in the technology of transportation and
communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate business activity, led to an
‘inevitable relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdiction’ over nonresident
individuals and corporations.” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958)
(Black, J., dissenting))).
25
See id.
26
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27
Id. at 316.
28
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
21
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jurisdiction if (1) the defendant had minimum contacts within
the forum and (2) subjecting the defendant to that forum’s
jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”29
To determine whether a defendant had minimum contacts to
satisfy general jurisdiction, the analysis focused on (1) whether
the defendant’s activities in that state were systematic and
continuous, and (2) whether those contacts availed the defendant
to the benefits and protection of the laws of that state.30 For
example, the Court in International Shoe observed that the
defendant corporation had sufficient minimum contacts in
Washington.31 Although the corporation did not have an office in
Washington, various company packages travelled in intrastate
commerce, and the salesmen were permanent Washington State
residents, regularly solicited orders within the state, and rented
space in hotels to display company product.32 The Court held this
surpassed the threshold of required contacts needed to
constitutionally hale the defendant corporation into the forum.
The Court also stressed that availing oneself to the benefits of
the state created certain obligations, including answering to
injured plaintiffs.33
After International Shoe, state governments acted to ensure
that personal jurisdiction did not just end at the state border by
Long-arm statutes codified
enacting long-arm statutes.34
International Shoe’s holding and its two-part test.35
Subsequently, Congress followed the states by enacting the
federal long-arm statute.36
However, the scope of general jurisdiction has since been
narrowed by two Supreme Court cases. In Goodyear, the Court
eliminated a jurisdictional theory that would allow foreign
corporate defendants to be brought into United States courts
solely on the premise that their commercial product located in

29
Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Myer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
30
Id. at 319.
31
Id. at 320.
32
Id. at 313–14.
33
Id. at 319.
34
Dane Reed Ullian, Note, Retroactive Application of State Long-Arm Statutes,
65 FLA. L. REV., 1653, 1659 (2013).
35
E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 2016).
36
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).

2016]

PROTECTING THE ANTITERRORISM TOOLS

1121

the forum created jurisdiction for a cause of action that occurred
wholly outside the forum.37 It was in this decision that the Court
first articulated the “at-home” standard.38
In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court reaffirmed and applied
the at-home standard. The Daimler litigation was instituted by
foreign Argentinian plaintiffs alleging violations of U.S. humanright laws for conduct occurring entirely in Argentina.39
Plaintiffs sought to hold Daimler AG, a German corporation,
vicariously liable for the alleged conduct of its subsidiary, MB
MB Argentina purportedly collaborated with
Argentina.40
Argentinian forces to harm plaintiffs and their relatives during
Argentina’s military dictatorship period, known as the “Dirty
War.”41 Although the litigation was premised on U.S. law, both
parties were foreign, and the cause of action occurred abroad.
Naturally, this raised the question of whether or not the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California could
properly exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the foreign
defendant.42
At the district court level, plaintiffs asserted two theories of
jurisdiction. First, they alleged that Daimler itself had sufficient
contacts with California under International Shoe’s minimum
contacts test.43 In the alternative, they argued jurisdiction could
be premised under an agency theory.44 Ultimately, the court
concluded that jurisdiction could not be exercised under either
theory.45 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
37
See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 930
(2011). Under this theory, known as the stream of commerce theory, a defendant
that puts a product into the marketplace creates ties with every forum in which his
product winds up. Id. at 926. The plaintiffs were trying to broaden the scope of
general jurisdiction by subjecting Goodyear Tire’s foreign subsidiaries in France,
Luxemburg, and Germany to litigation in any jurisdiction touched by the company’s
distribution chain. Id. at 918.
38
Id. at 929.
39
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014).
40
Id. at 752.
41
Id. at 751.
42
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG (DaimlerChrysler I), No. C-04-00194 RMW,
2005 WL 3157472, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005).
43
Id. at *5.
44
Id. at *10. Under this theory, plaintiffs asserted the contacts of Daimler’s U.S.
subsidiary, MBUSA, could be imputed upon Daimler because MBUSA can be
classified as Daimler’s agent. Id.
45
Before coming to a final decision, the court did allow for limited jurisdictional
discovery on the agency theory only. Id. at *19. However, following discovery, the
court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Bauman v.
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Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding and found that
it was reasonable to premise jurisdiction under the agency
theory.46 Thereafter, Daimler petitioned for writ of certiorari,
and, in April of 2013, the Supreme Court granted it.47
The issue on appeal was “whether, consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Daimler [wa]s
amenable to suit in California courts for claims involving only
foreign plaintiffs and conduct occurring entirely abroad.”48
Although the Court acknowledged that the agency theory can be
grounds for general jurisdiction in some cases, it found that the
Ninth Circuit applied the principles too loosely and, in doing so,
impermissibly expanded the reach of general jurisdiction.49
Instead, the Court focused its analysis on Daimler’s own contacts
with California, absent the MBUSA connection.
The Court surveyed general jurisdiction jurisprudence and
held that jurisdiction could not be exended constitutionally over
Daimler.50 In acknowledging that International Shoe opened the
court’s doors to widespread litigation against nonresident and
foreign defendants, the Court emphasized that general
jurisdiction still imposed a high burden.51 In interpreting this
burden, the Court declared a new standard. No longer would it
be reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants on
the basis of minimum contacts.
Under the Court’s new general jurisdiction standard, a
plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the foreign defendant
must have systematic and continuous contacts in the forum;
(2) those contacts must render the defendant at home in that
forum; and (3) exercising jurisdiction over the defendant must be
DaimlerChrysler AG (DaimlerChrysler II), No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2007 WL 486389,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
(DaimlerChrysler III), 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011).
46
DaimlerChrysler III, 644 F.3d at 931 (“To the ordinary American, and
certainly to us, it would seem odd, indeed, if the manufacturer of Mercedes-Benz,
which are sold in California in vast numbers by its American subsidiary, for use on
the state’s streets and highways, could not be required to appear in the federal
courts of that state.”).
47
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman (DaimlerChrysler IV), 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).
48
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014).
49
Id. at 759. Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, any foreign company could
essentially be subject to U.S. jurisdiction in any state where it had a subsidiary. Id.
at 759–60.
50
Id. at 753–58.
51
See id. at 755; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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reasonable to comport with due-process standards.52
To
determine whether a defendant is at home in the forum, the
Court provided guidelines directed at individuals and
corporations.53 A corporation will always be deemed at home in
its place of incorporation and principal place of business.54 The
Court noted this analysis was not absolute and a corporation
could still potentially be subject to general jurisdiction outside of
those two identifiable forums.55 However, no guidelines were
provided to determine these exceptional cases of when general
jurisdiction would arise outside the forum in which the
corporation was incorporated or had its principal place of
business.56
In applying this framework to the facts, the Court concluded
that general jurisdiction could not be exercised over Daimler.
Daimler is not at home in California because it is neither
incorporated nor has its principal place of business there.57
Additionally, the Court noted that even if MBUSA’s contacts
were imputed to Daimler, it would still be insufficient to render
Daimler at home in California.58 The Court reasoned that the
underlying principle of general jurisdiction is to give defendants
certainty as to where they may be amenable to lawsuits,
therefore bringing Daimler into a California court would violate
this principle.59 The Court stressed that narrowing the analysis
to a corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of
business makes it easier for both plaintiffs and defendants to
ascertain suitable forums for litigation.60

52
See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (adding to International Shoe inquiry by
interpreting Goodyear to additionally require contacts that render the defendant at
home within the state).
53
Id. at 760.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See id.
57
Id. at 761. Because Daimler did not satisfy either of these paradigm forums,
the Court acknowledged that Daimler was essentially immune to U.S. litigation on
this matter.
58
Id. at 761–62.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 760.
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Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992: § 2333(a) Civil Cases

To bring an action in federal court, there must be a cause of
action that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over.
Congress has the ability to broaden federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction to include causes of action that previously did not
exist. For example, in October of 1985, the Klinghoffer family
was vacationing on the Italian cruise ship, Achille Lauro.61
While out at sea, the cruise ship was seized.62 Leon Klinghoffer,
a father who was restricted to a wheelchair, was shot and thrown
into the Mediterranean by terrorists as his family was forced to
watch.63 His surviving family brought a civil suit against the
cruise line in S.D.N.Y. in which the Palestine Liberation
Organization (“PLO”) was impleaded.64 It was alleged that
members of the PLO carried out the seizure and subsequent
terrorist attacks on the ship.
The federal district court needed to decide if it could properly
exercise jurisdiction over the PLO,65 a foreign unincorporated
association for the Palestinian people. The court found that the
PLO had sufficient contacts in New York to satisfy personal
It premised subject-matter jurisdiction on
jurisdiction.66
admiralty law, because the cause of action arose in international
waters.67 This was the first time a foreign terrorist organization
was haled into a U.S. courtroom.68
Although this case was viewed as a triumph over terrorism,69
the limitations of the jurisdictional ruling became evident.70
61
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro
in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 739 F. Supp. 854, 856 (1990).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 857.
65
See infra Section II.A (explaining the PLO).
66
Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 861–63 (applying general jurisdiction principles
articulated in International Shoe).
67
Id. at 859.
68
Hearings, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Alan J. Kreczko).
69
The case never proceeded to trial because the PLO and Klinghoffer family
agreed to an out-of-court settlement for an undisclosed sum. Benjamin Weiser, A
Settlement with P.L.O. Over Terror on a Cruise, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 1997), http://
www.nytimes.com/1997/08/12/world/a-settlement-with-plo-over-terror-on-a-cruise.h
tml.
70
Hearings, supra note 1, at 61 (statement of The Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer
Memorial Foundation) (“If the killing had taken place upon an aircraft or on another
nation’s soil, the court may well have rejected our attempt to recover from the PLO
for the harms inflicted upon my family.”).
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Antiterrorism law at the time only provided for criminal
penalties over international terrorism acts involving U.S.
citizens.71 No statute specifically granted civil jurisdiction over
terrorist activity abroad. The Klinghoffers were able to satisfy
the jurisdictional requirements, not because the case involved
terrorism, but because the case was at sea. United States
Senator Grassley recognized this problem and responded by
introducing Senate Bill 2465.72 The bill was structured to expand
the Klinghoffer ruling by granting federal district courts the
power to hear a civil cause of action involving an American
citizen injured by an international act of terrorism.73
The contents of Senate Bill 2465 was eventually passed into
74
law pursuant to Congress’s power to “define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
against the Law of Nations.”75 The enactment was known as the
Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”). Section 2333(a) of the ATA grants:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international
terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue
therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States
and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and
the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.76

The statute was constructed vaguely. The language of the
statute states that a private citizen can bring a civil action
against someone who commits “an act of international
terrorism.”77 However, it does not explicitly specify if these
actions can only be brought against the perpetrator of the attack
or someone indirectly involved, for example a sponsor. To
provide some jurisdictional guidelines, Wendy Collins Perdue, a
Georgetown University Law Center civil procedure professor,
answered related questions at the bill’s Subcommittee Hearing.78

71

See 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2012).
Senate Bill 2465 was originally introduced in the 101st Congress, but it was
Senate Bill 1569 that was ultimately passed into law in the following Congress. S.
Res. 1569, 102d Cong. (1992) (enacted).
73
Hearings, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Alan J. Kreczko).
74
Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat.
4506.
75
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
76
18 U.S.C § 2333(a) (2012).
77
Id.
78
Hearings, supra note 1, at 121 (statement of Professor Wendy Collins Perdue).
72
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Professor Perdue acknowledged the possibility that
jurisdiction could extend beyond the actual perpetrator. She
stated that jurisdiction could likely be exercised over an entity or
corporation involved with a terrorist attack by satisfying the
minimum contacts test as laid out in International Shoe.79
Notably, she stated that plaintiffs would only realistically be able
to recover from an entity with assets, as opposed to the
individual terrorist that carried out the attack.80 She admitted
the language was unclear, but again, reaffirmed that if victims
were to be provided “any meaningful remedy, liability must
extend beyond the few individuals who actually execute the
terrorist act.”81
Ultimately, whether the ATA extended beyond the mere
perpetrator to a third party was a question to be decided by the
courts.82 Section 2333(a) was first interpreted in Boim v. Quranic
Literacy Institute.83 In Boim, the court addressed whether
jurisdiction could properly be exercised over two organizations
that allegedly provided material support to the terrorists that
murdered a seventeen-year-old American boy waiting at a bus
stop in Israel.84 In answering that question, the court analyzed
the potential class of defendants within the jurisdictional scope of
§ 2333(a).
First, to determine potential defendants that could be sued
under § 2333(a), the court looked to the plain language of the
statue to determine Congress’s intent.85 The court focused on the
word “involve” in the statute’s definition of “international
terrorism” to determine which class of defendants the statute

79

Id.
Id. at 126 (“It is the organizations, businesses and nations who support,
encourage and supply terrorists who are likely to have reachable assets.”); see also
Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?: The Misuse of the Civil Suit Provision
of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 547 (2013) (“It may be exceedingly
rare for a terrorist group to have attachable assets in the United States, but where
such a terrorist group exists, it should be subject to suit.”).
81
Hearings, supra note 1, at 127.
82
See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (noting it is the job
of the courts to interpret Congressional statutory language).
83
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1001 (7th Cir. 2002).
84
Id. at 1002–03.
85
Id. at 1009.
80
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was meant to include.86 However, the plain language of the
statute could not provide further insight as to a potential class of
defendants.
Next, the court looked to the statute’s legislative history and
to tort law principles.87 In reviewing the Senate Report, the court
concluded that the statute was “clearly . . . meant to reach
beyond those persons who themselves commit the violent act that
directly causes the injury.”88 Given Congress’s intent, the court
construed the statute broadly and explained a broad statutory
construction was imperative because, similar to tort law, drafters
cannot anticipate the wide variety of fact patterns that will fall
within the statute’s confines.89
Again, in Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court was
faced with a § 2333(a) case.90 The Wultz case arose out of a
suicide bombing occurring in a Tel Aviv restaurant that killed a
sixteen-year-old American boy, Daniel Wultz.91 Daniel’s family
brought the litigation under the ATA alleging that the defendant,
the Bank of China, knowingly executed dozens of wire transfers,
totaling several million dollars, to the attacker’s organization,
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.92 Similar to Boim, the issue was
whether secondary liability could be attributed to the defendant
under the ATA’s civil action provision for executing the wire
transfers that furthered the terrorist attack.93

86
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A) (2012) (defining international terrorism as
“activities that . . . involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any
State”).
87
Boim, 291 F.3d at 1011.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 1011–12. Ultimately, on the facts presented before the court, the court
held that simply making a financial contribution to a terrorist organization does not
subject that actor to § 2333(a) liability. Id. at 1028. However, the court did say that
funding by an organization would be subject to liability if it fell into the aiding and
abetting category. Id. Embracing this theory, several plaintiffs have sought damages
from a variety of banks, such as Bank of China, Credit Lyonnais SA, HSBC, and
Royal Bank of Scotland Group. See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-060702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006).
90
755 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
91
Id. at 18.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 54.
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In trying to decipher whether the statutory language of
§ 2333(a) extended to secondary actors, the court started with the
general presumption that plaintiffs in civil actions cannot sue
parties that allegedly aid or abet.94 However, because Congress
expressly created a private right of action by enacting § 2333(a)
and used broad statutory language, the court concluded that tort
law principles applied to the statute and overrides the
presumption.95 Hence, the courts in both Boim and Wultz agreed
that liability under § 2333(a) extended beyond the mere
perpetrator.
II. DAIMLER’S APPLICATION IN § 2333(A) CASES
The United States Supreme Court, in articulating a new
general jurisdiction standard, did not account for the difficulty
lower courts would face in its application. After the Supreme
Court issued its Daimler decision, courts immediately adjusted
the general jurisdiction analysis. However, application of the
test has proved to be challenging. For example, the United
States District Courts for the Southern District of New York
(“S.D.N.Y.”) and District of Columbia (“D.D.C.”) have applied
Daimler to ATA § 2333(a) foreign defendants and have reached
contrasting decisions. More recently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the S.D.N.Y. decision
and adopted the position set forth in the D.D.C. opinions.
However, a review by the Second Circuit or a writ of certiorari
may be filed by the plaintiffs in the S.D.N.Y. case.96
A.

The PLO and PA: Representatives for a Unified Palestine

The PLO was formed as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict that has evolved over the past century. The main issue
involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is “whether the
Palestinian people should be allowed to form their own
independent country and government in an area that is currently

94
Id. at 55 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994)).
95
Id.
96
Hana Levi Julian, US 2nd Circuit Appeals Court Reverses Anti-Terror Verdict
Against Palestinian Authority, PLO, JEWISH PRESS: NEWS & VIEWS (Aug. 31, 2016),
http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/us-2nd-circuit-appeals-courtreverses-anti-terror-verdict-against-palestinian-authority-plo/2016/08/31.
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part of the nation of Israel.”97 The conflicting views of Israelis
and Palestinians are exhibited through the various military
invasions, instability, and violence that the region has endured
for decades.98 Peace has never been reached and the conflict
continues to persist today.99
The PLO was formed to create a “central leadership” body for
Palestinians in order to liberate their people and form a
Palestinian region.100 Since its creation in 1964, numerous
attacks in Israel have been attributed to the PLO, and the
organization has continuously made appearances on and off the
United States’s list of foreign terrorist organizations.101 When
the organization acquired some rights in the West Bank and
Gaza in 1993, the PLO formed the PA to focus its mission in that
region.102

97
An Overview of Relations Between Israel and Palestine, EBSCO HOST:
POLITICS, http://connection.ebscohost.com/politics/israel-palestinians/overview-relat
ions-between-israel-and-palestine (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
98
See Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND.: NEWS, http://
www.trust.org/spotlight/Israeli-Palestinian-conflict/?tab=briefing (last updated July
23, 2014).
99
See id.; see, e.g., Ben Wedeman, Israeli-Palestinian Violence: What You Need
To Know, CNN (Oct. 15, 2015, 8:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/14/middleeast/
israel-palestinians-violence-explainer.
100
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://
www.britannica.com/topic/Palestine-Liberation-Organization (last updated Aug. 25,
2009). In the Klinghoffer case, the court noted the PLO’s description of their
organization:
[T]he internationally recognized representative of a sovereign people who
are seeking to exercise their rights to self-determination, national
independence, and territorial integrity. The PLO is the internationally
recognized embodiment of the nationhood and sovereignty of the
Palestinian people while they await the restoration of their rights through
the establishment of a [comprehensive], just and lasting peace in the
Middle East.
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in
Amministrazione Straordinaria, 739 F. Supp. 854, 857 (1990).
101
Adam Kredo, Congress Works To Shutter Palestine Liberation Organization
D.C. Office, WASH. FREE BEACON (Feb. 11, 2016, 1:35 PM), http://freebeacon.com/na
tional-security/congress-works-to-shutter-palestine-liberation-organization-d-c-office/
print; S. Res. 2537, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted).
102
Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org. (Sokolow II), 60 F. Supp. 3d 509, 513
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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S.D.N.Y. District Court Does Not Allow Daimler To Preclude
General Jurisdiction

In 2014, an S.D.N.Y. District Court announced that despite
the recent Supreme Court ruling in Daimler, private U.S.
citizens were allowed to institute a civil action against the PLO
and the PA.103 The litigation, Sokolow v. PLO, focused on a series
of terrorist attacks, occurring in and around Jerusalem between
2001 and 2004, that left U.S. citizens either killed or seriously
injured.104 The plaintiffs105 sought to exercise their right under
ATA § 2333(a) to commence a civil proceeding against actors of
international terrorism.106
The PLO and PA were named
defendants for alleged involvement in planning, carrying out, and
rewarding the perpetrators of the various attacks.107
Subsequently, the PLO and the PA moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.108 In determining
whether the foreign defendants were amenable to U.S.
jurisdiction, the court first articulated the standard: “In the
context of ATA litigation, a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing
of personal jurisdiction if: (1) service of process was properly
effected as to the defendant109 . . . and (2) the defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with the United States as a whole to
satisfy a traditional due process analysis.”110 Hence, the court
followed the conventional International Shoe inquiry of minimum
contacts and availing itself of the forum.111
The court’s analysis disclosed that the PLO and PA had
surpassed the minimum threshold of contacts required. First,
the PLO and PA operated a fully functional office in Washington,
D.C.112 Additionally, to run the office, they engaged in multiple
commercial contracts with U.S. businesses, including for office
supplies
and
equipment,
postage,
shipping,
news
103

Id. at 509.
Id. at 512.
105
The plaintiffs were the guardians, family members, and personal
representatives of the estates of the citizens killed or injured in the terrorist attacks.
Id.
106
Id. at 515.
107
Id. at 512–13.
108
Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org. (Sokolow I), No. 04 CV 00397(GBD),
2011 WL 1345086, at *1 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 30, 2011).
109
Defendants did not contest service. Id. at *2.
110
Id.
111
See id. at *3.
112
Id.
104
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services/subscriptions, telecommunications, Internet, IT support,
accounting and legal services, and credit cards.113 Second, PLO
and PA employees engaged in a variety of promotional
endeavors, including interviews and speeches, that were usually
broadcasted on major national U.S. news networks.114 Third,
they managed two domestic bank accounts and a Certificate of
Deposit account.115 Fourth, the PA entered into a multiyear,
multimillion-dollar contract with a U.S. consulting and lobbying
firm for the purpose of having their agents represent the PA in
political activities to broadcast their mission.116
In determining the reasonableness of subjecting the
defendants to U.S. jurisdiction, the defendants did not meet their
burden of establishing a due process violation.117 The court noted
that the defendants were subject to U.S. jurisdiction on
numerous occasions in the past and had rigorously defended
these litigations.118 Thus, the court denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, a conclusion consistent with other federal
courts that have applied the International Shoe framework to the
PLO and PA.
However, after the Supreme Court decided Daimler, the
defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
the court no longer could exercise personal jurisdiction over
them.119 Defendants argued that under Daimler and a Second
Circuit case adopting Daimler, their U.S. activities were
substantially smaller compared to their global activities,
meaning they could not be rendered “at home” within the U.S.120
The court ruled that Daimler did not preclude the lawsuit
and maintained that personal jurisdiction could still be properly
exercised.121 First, it highlighted the Court’s admittance that the
new standard was not absolute; not every defendant falls within
the paradigm corporate forums laid out in Daimler.122 Second,

113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Sokolow III, No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1,

2014).
120
121
122

See id. (citing Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014)).
Id. at *2.
See id.
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the defendants did not produce evidence to establish that they
were at home somewhere other than the U.S.123 Therefore, the
court reaffirmed its previous finding of personal jurisdiction.124
Because the court could properly exercise jurisdiction over
the defendants, the case proceeded to a jury trial. Ultimately,
the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and returned a $218.5
million verdict, which was increased to $655.5 million in
accordance with ATA’s treble damages provision.125
C.

D.D.C. Finds Daimler To Preclude General Jurisdiction

D.D.C. litigation of § 2333(a) cases produced a markedly
different Daimler analysis compared to the approach in Sokolow.
The first D.D.C. court to face the issue of whether Daimler
precluded the PLO and PA in § 2333(a) cases was Estate of
Klieman v. Palestinian Authority. The case was brought after
Esther Klieman, an American schoolteacher, was killed by a
Palestinian terrorist who open fired at a public bus in Israel.126
Two years after the filing, the PLO and PA moved to dismiss
the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.127 More specifically,
the defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not satisfy their
burden of demonstrating that the defendants had minimum
contacts within the U.S.128 This defense was rejected on the
grounds that it was generally accepted among courts that the
PLO and PA engaged in sufficient activities in the U.S. so as to
satisfy minimum contacts.129
Similar to the Sokolow case, after the Daimler decision, the
PLO and the PA moved for reconsideration on the court’s
personal jurisdiction ruling.130 In analyzing the defendants’
motion, the court compared the pre- and post-Daimler standards.
123

Id.
Id.
125
Sokolow IV, No. 04 CIVIL 00397 (GBD), 2015 WL 10852003, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 1, 2015), vacated, Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir.
2016); 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).
126
Complaint at 23–25, Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth. (Klieman I), 467
F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 1:04-cv-01173).
127
Klieman I, 467 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110 (D.D.C. 2006).
128
See id.
129
Id. at 113 (“Other federal courts in the United States have determined that
both the PA and the PLO have sufficient minimum contacts with the United States
to permit suit here consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution . . . [and] [t]his Court agrees.”).
130
Klieman II, 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239 (D.D.C. 2015).
124
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The court noted that before Daimler, courts exercised personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if they (1) had minimum
contacts within the forum and (2) could have reasonably foreseen
being subject to D.D.C. jurisdiction.131 The court noted that after
Daimler, plaintiffs must additionally establish that the
defendant’s minimum contacts essentially render them at home
in the U.S.132
The court acknowledged that the PLO and PA had numerous
contacts within the U.S.,133 precisely the same contacts the
Sokolow court considered. However, unlike the Sokolow court,
the court focused its analysis on the defendants’ activities
internationally to determine whether those U.S. contacts could
essentially render the defendants at home in the U.S.134 The
court emphasized that the PLO was based in the West Bank and
the PA was based in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; thus, a
majority of their activities occurred in these locations.135
Additionally, comparing the defendants’ U.S. contacts with their
international contacts highlighted that their U.S. operations only
represented a small portion of their overall activity.136 The court
further compared these facts with those of Daimler and
concluded that the PLO and PA’s contacts with the U.S. were
fewer than Daimler’s contacts with California.137 Hence, the
court concluded that under Daimler, the PLO and PA could not
be rendered at home in the U.S and granted summary
judgment.138
In addition to Estate of Klieman, two subsequent ATA civil
cases have been brought in the D.D.C. courts: Livnat v.
Palestinian Authority and Safra v. Palestinian Authority.139 Both
of these cases reached the same conclusion: the PA could not be
summoned to a U.S. court, because it is not at home in the U.S.
Importantly, the court in Livnat addressed the plaintiff’s

131

Id. at 242 (articulating the International Shoe approach).
Id.
133
Id. at 245–46.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 245.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 242, 245 (“Daimler’s U.S. subsidiary, its continuous business
operations, and commercial sales accounting for 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales
were insufficient to support general jurisdiction.”).
138
Id. at 250.
139
82 F. Supp. 3d 19 (D.D.C. 2015); 82 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D.D.C. 2015).
132
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argument that Daimler does not apply to organizations, such as
the PA.140 The court responded by saying that Daimler is not
necessarily limited to corporate entities simply because the
Daimler Court did not explicitly state that the standard applies
In reading Daimler
to entities other than corporations.141
broadly, the court stated the focus should be on how to apply the
standard to organizations like the PA and not whether these
organizations are subject to Daimler.142
In determining how to apply the Daimler standard to these
organizations, the court relied on the analysis performed in
another D.D.C. case, Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus.143 In Toumazou, the court was tasked with applying
Daimler to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a
“democratic republic” that governs a portion of Cyprus, but is not
recognized by the U.S. as a sovereign government.144 The TRNC
was deemed to be at home in Cyprus, the land it governed,
because a majority of its activities were carried out there.145 The
Livnat court concluded that because TRNC was deemed at home
in Cyprus, the PA must therefore be deemed at home in the West
Bank—the PA’s governing land and center of activities.146 The
court explained that drawing this inference was permissible
because “[i]t is common sense that the single ascertainable place
where a government such a[s] the Palestinian Authority should
be amenable to suit for all purposes is the place where it
governs.”147 Additionally, the court listed some of the PA’s
activities that lend support to the conclusion that the PA is a
government operating abroad: (1) consular services and
(2) services like community outreach and cultural events.148
In all three D.D.C. cases, the courts expressly stated
disagreement with the Sokolow court’s personal jurisdiction
ruling. The D.D.C. courts disagreed with the Sokolow court’s
finding that the defendants failed to rebut the plaintiff’s evidence
by establishing that the PA was at home somewhere else besides
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 30; 71 F. Supp. 3d 7 (2014).
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30.
Toumazou, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 15.
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30.
Id.
Id. at 30–31.
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the U.S.149 In doing this, the D.D.C. courts stated the Sokolow
court impermissibly shifted the burden from the plaintiff, who
must establish the defendant is at home in the U.S., to the
defendants to establish they are at home somewhere else.150
D. Second Circuit Reverses Sokolow and Adopts D.D.C. Position
On August 31, 2016, the Second Circuit rendered its decision
reversing the district court’s holding that it had personal
jurisdiction over the PLO and PA.151 After the landmark jury
decision awarding millions of dollars to the plaintiffs, the
defendants sought to overturn it by again arguing lack of
personal jurisdiction.152 The Second Circuit disagreed with the
lower court and found that it could not constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction over the PLO.153 First, the court found that
Daimler applied—even though the PLO and PA are not
corporations—because the Supreme Court did not intend to
distinguish
between
corporations
and
unincorporated
associations in performing the at-home analysis.154 Therefore,
the court proceeded to perform the at-home analysis and found
that the evidence showed the defendants were at home in
Palestine.155 It dismissed the lower court’s conclusion that the
defendants’ U.S. contacts could render them at home in the U.S.
Second, the court refused to interpret the facts of the case as
“exceptional” and, therefore, out of Daimler’s realm, which would
have allowed for a different personal jurisdictional analysis.156
In finding that the district court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendants, the Second Circuit vacated the
district court’s judgment and remanded the case with
instructions to dismiss the case for lack of personal

149

Klieman II, 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246 (D.D.C. 2015).
Id.; Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 31; Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d
37, 49 (D.D.C. 2015).
151
Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., Nos. 15–3135–cv (L); 15–3151–cv
(XAP), 2016 WL 4537369, at *20 (2d Cir. 2016).
152
Id. at *7.
153
Id. at *13.
154
Id. at *10.
155
Id. at *11.
156
Id. at *13.
150
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jurisdiction.157
The plaintiffs have expressed interest in
requesting a review by the full Second Circuit or the possibility of
filing an appeal to the Supreme Court.158
III. THE SUPREME COURT NEEDS TO EXEMPT APPLICATION OF
DAIMLER IN § 2333(A) CASES
Whether foreign sponsors of terrorism can be haled into U.S.
courts should be addressed by the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court must carve out an exception to Daimler by
exempting plaintiffs in § 2333(a) cases from satisfying the “athome” test when proceeding against foreign sponsors of
terrorism. Due process, the touchstone of determining general
jurisdiction, demands fundamental fairness and substantial
justice.
By continuing to bring these foreign sponsors of
terrorism into federal court, the Court would be balancing (1) the
U.S.’s interest in providing a forum for American victims of
terrorism and (2) foreign defendants’ interest in not being forced
to defend actions in a jurisdiction with which they have no
connection. In following these principles, the Supreme Court
would appropriately narrow Daimler while satisfying
fundamental fairness and substantial justice.159
By exempting Daimler in § 2333(a) cases, plaintiffs would
still need to prove that the court has general jurisdiction under
International Shoe by proving: (1) systematic contacts and
(2) reasonableness. The International Shoe standard is not only
the standard that foreign defendants in § 2333(a) cases have
been subjected to for the past two decades, but also the only
fundamentally fair option. If these defendants have systematic
and continuous contacts in the U.S. and purposefully avail
themselves of the benefits of the laws and protections of the U.S.,
American citizens should be able to exercise their right to hold
them accountable for their involvement in international
terrorism. Otherwise, § 2333(a) serves very little purpose.

157

Id. at *20.
Julian, supra note 96.
159
See Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Be Careful What You Wish for:
Goodyear, Daimler, and the Evisceration of General Jurisdiction, 64 EMORY L.J.
2001, 2012 (2014).
158
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IV. DAIMLER DOES NOT APPLY TO § 2333(A) CASES
Applying Daimler in cases where the PLO and PA are named
foreign defendants is only one example highlighting the
constitutional implications of applying the “at-home” test to
foreign defendants allegedly sponsoring terrorism in § 2333(a)
cases. The Islasmic State of Iraq and the Levant, a U.S.
designated foreign terrorist organization that has inflitrated the
U.S. media and Internet to gain support and funding from U.S.
citizens to carry out overseas attacks, is just another example of
a terrorist group that will be immune to civil litigation by virtue
of never being truly at home in the U.S. Cases brought under
§ 2333(a) are symbolic, sensitive, and meant to compensate
victims harmed by international acts of terrorism. By applying
Daimler to § 2333(a) cases, it becomes nearly impossible for
American citizens to exercise this right against not only the PLO
and PA but a variety of foreign actors that by virtue of their
mission or policies will never be at home in the U.S.
A.

Daimler’s “At-home” Test Undermines § 2333(a) and
Destabilizes National Security

Foreign organizations will be virtually immune to § 2333(a)
cases if Daimler applies, because organizations like the PLO and
PA will rarely be reachable under general jurisdiction. Foreign
organizations can be brought into U.S. courts under theories of
specific or general jurisdiction.160 To be brought into the U.S.
under specific jurisdiction, the cause of action must have arose
from or must be related to the forum.161 Markedly, in Daimler,
the United States Supreme Court attributed the growth in
specific jurisdiction to the limited need for general jurisdiction.162
However, even though specific jurisdiction is more frequently
utilized, it “is not sufficiently broad to eliminate the need for a
more generous scope of general jurisdiction.”163 This is best
illustrated by the fact that § 2333(a) defendants cannot be haled
into federal court under specific jurisdiction because § 2333(a)

160

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923–24

(2011).
161
162
163

Id.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757–58 (2014).
Arthur & Freer, supra note 159, at 2013.
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cases specifically deal with international acts.164 With specific
jurisdiction unavailable, plaintiffs can only reach these foreign
defendants with general jurisdiction, but organizations like the
PLO and the PA will likely never be at home in the U.S. by way
of their mission statement; U.S. plaintiffs seeking to sue these
defendants will be left with no domestic forum options.165
Because organizations, such as the PLO and PA, will be
virtually immune to civil litigation and free to continue backing
terrorism, the deterrent effect of the ATA is diminished. The
bill’s purpose was not only to merely compensate U.S. citizens. It
was meant to deter terrorist groups from (1) maintaining assets
in the U.S.; (2) benefitting from U.S. investments; and
(3) soliciting funds within the U.S.166 It was also meant to
encourage other countries to pass similar legislation, which
would effectively create significant hurdles for terrorist
operations.167 These purposes cannot be fulfilled if U.S. plaintiffs
cannot acquire jurisdiction over § 2333(a) foreign defendants.
Not only does this undermine the ATA and the injured
plaintiff’s right to a remedy, but also it weakens the nation’s
counterterrorism efforts.168 Specifically, the United States in a
Statement of Interest submitted in the Sokolow case stated:
The ability of victims to recover under the ATA also advances
U.S. national security interests. The law reflects our nation’s
compelling interest in combatting and deterring terrorism at
every level, including by eliminating sources of terrorist funding
and holding sponsors of terrorism accountable for their actions.
Imposing civil liability on those who commit or sponsor acts of

164
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012); see also supra Section I.A (defining specific
jurisdiction).
165
See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t should be
obvious . . . the ultimate effect of the majority’s approach . . . . Under the majority’s
rule, for example, a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a foreign
hotel owned by a multinational conglomerate will be unable to hold the hotel to
account in a single U.S. court, even if the hotel company has a massive presence in
multiple States . . . . [T]he majority’s approach would preclude the[se types of]
plaintiffs . . . from seeking recourse anywhere in the United States even if no other
judicial system was available to provide relief.”). The D.D.C. courts conceded to this
when it concluded the PLO and PA can only be at home in the place in which they
govern. Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 30 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v.
Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2015).
166
Hearings, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Alan J. Kreczko).
167
Id.
168
Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 2, Sokolow v.
Palestine Liberation Org., No. 04-CV-397 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2015).
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terrorism is an important means of deterring and defeating
terrorist activity. Further, compensation of victims at the
expense of those who have committed or supported terrorist acts
contributes to U.S. efforts to disrupt the financing of terrorism
and to impede the flow of funds or other support to terrorist
activity.169

Without funding, terrorist operations cannot be sustained.170
Section 2333(a) was designed to diminish terrorism financing by
allowing victims to collect damages.171 If Daimler applied to
§ 2333(a) cases, the burden of establishing a foreign sponsor of
terrorism at home in the U.S. would make it nearly impossible to
assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants and would hinder the
nation’s counterterrorism efforts and the ATA.
B.

Daimler’s “At-Home” Test was Not Written with an Eye
Towards § 2333(a) Defendants

1.

Foreign Sponsors of Terrorism Fail To Satisfy Daimler’s
Economic Policymaking Justification

The Daimler Court imposed the at-home test to establish a
jurisdictional standard through which defendants could easily
ascertain the U.S. forums in which they could be subject to
litigation. The Court focused on corporations and made clear
that it was restricting lawsuits against corporations to their
place of incorporation and principal place of business, because
The underlying
those forums are easily ascertainable.172
rationale for creating a standard that is easily ascertainable was
based on principles of international economic policymaking.173
These principles rest on the theory that an “expansive exercise of
169

Id.
Taylor, supra note 6.
171
Hearings, supra note 1, at 12.
172
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). Despite the Court
striving to create easily ascertainable forums for corporations, corporations after
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jurisdiction. See Harold K. Gordon & Sevan Ogulluk, New York Tests Daimler’s
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Accountability, W. NEW ENG. UNIV. SCH. L. (Feb. 20, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://digital
commons.law.wne.edu/media/104.
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jurisdiction would lead to unpredictability about where
corporations could be sued, thereby discouraging foreign
investment.”174
Thus, the Court’s reasoning offers greater
protection to foreign defendants by limiting their liability in
order to maintain economic stability in the U.S.175
Plainly read, this reasoning is directed towards corporations
that promote or fuel the U.S. economy,176 not organizations
similar to the PLO and PA that are not involved in promoting
economic activity in America. This is further supported by the
position the United States took in its Amicus Curiae Brief
submitted in the Daimler case:
In some instances, the interests of the United States are served
by permitting suits against foreign entities to go forward in
domestic courts.
But expansive assertions of general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations may operate to the
detriment of the United States’ diplomatic relations and its
foreign trade and economic interests.177

Terrorism-related cases are an “instance” in which the U.S.’s
interests are better served. The primary purpose for the PLO’s
and PA’s presence in the U.S. is not economically related but
instead focuses on endorsing liberation, establishing a
Palestinian region, and raising funds to assist the process.178
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predictability—the very principles underpinning personal jurisdiction—in favor of
protecting big business from jurisdictional vulnerability.”); see also Stephanie
Denker, Comment, The Future of General Jurisdiction: The Effects of Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 145, 166–69 (2014) (“Companies prefer to
invest and do business in places where they can predict the jurisdictional
consequences of their actions.”).
176
At the time, there was a real threat of companies scaling back U.S.
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German entities stated in a brief of Amici Curiae:
Since these Bauman-influenced decisions, the German Viega Companies
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with more predictable legal environments. Absent reversal, the German
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Brief for Petitioner, DaimlerChrysler IV, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (No. 11-965), 2013
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Certainly, the Supreme Court did not intend to give equal
protection to both foreign corporations that invest vast amounts
of money in the U.S. and foreign organizations using their
American presence to promote a mission that is related to
sponsorship of terrorist acts.179
2.

Daimler Never Intended To Blanket All Foreign Defendants
and Strip U.S. Terrorism Victims of a Remedy

The plain language of the Daimler opinion is evidence that
the Court did not intend to blanket all foreign defendants under
its new at-home standard.180 If the Court wanted the test to
apply to every foreign defendant, the Court would have explicitly
stated so or structured its opinion broadly, instead of focusing on
corporations and the economic policymaking behind it.181
Notably, “it said nothing about how one might determine where
noncorporate associations (including labor unions, partnerships,
and limited liability companies) might be ‘at home.’ ”182 Even
within the context of corporations, the Court admitted a foreign
defendant may, in exceptional cases, be subject to personal
jurisdiction in a forum other than the two corporate paradigm
forums the Court listed, but it did not address when this
exception would apply nor did it provide factors courts should
look at to determine if a corporation falls within this category.183
Foreign sponsors of terrorism are the type of defendant that
should merit such an exception to Daimler. Organizations like
the PLO and the PA are unincorporated associations.184 These
organizations do not have a place of incorporation or principal

179
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Vivek Krishnamurthy, Daimler AG v. Bauman: In Latest ATS Decision, the
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place of business, because they are not corporations.185
Therefore, where these organizations are at home is not as
straightforward under the Court’s guidelines. The underlying
principle of the Court’s jurisdictional at-home test is, therefore,
weakened because these defendants are not provided notice as to
where they are amenable to litigation.186
Public policy supports the premise that foreign sponsors of
terrorism should be exempted from Daimler’s personal
jurisdiction analysis. It is against public policy to allow the PLO
and PA to operate in the U.S. while concurrently killing and
injuring American citizens abroad.187 There must be some
protection for American citizens outside the U.S. border.188
Allowing U.S. citizens to civilly attack organizations that aid
terrorist attacks can provide some protection because, if Daimler
does not apply, these organizations could potentially face a
lawsuit and fatal monetary damages that could impede their
terrorism financing and, thus, reduce the frequency of terrorist
attacks.189 The Daimler Court was not thinking about terrorism
and terrorism-related defendants when it opined the “at-home”
test and, hence, the test should not be extended to all foreign
defendants.
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Due Process Demands Fairness, and It Is Not Fair to Subject
§ 2333(a) Defendants to Daimler’s “At-Home” Test

Application of the at-home test to the facts in Daimler
comports more with fundamental fairness than application of the
test in § 2333(a) cases. The facts of Daimler were an outlier; the
case dealt with a foreign plaintiff, a foreign defendant, and a
cause of action that arose in a foreign country with which the
defendant was not directly involved.190 If the Court found
general jurisdiction to exist, essentially every foreign corporation
engaged in some business in the U.S. would be amenable to suit
in the U.S. by either domestic or foreign plaintiffs for causes of
action that accrued in any part of the world. Certainly, this
would violate due process.
However, these circumstances are not present in § 2333(a)
cases. First, these defendants have been put on notice since the
enactment of § 2333(a) and by subsequent cases that have been
brought pursuant to it. Second, these defendants have harmed
an American.191 These proceedings will always yield a domestic
interest, because Congress only granted private American
citizens, including survivors, estates and heirs, the constitutional
right to bring § 2333(a) cases.192 Third, the statute specifically
allows for causes of actions that accrue internationally.193
Therefore, Congress has put foreign defendants on constructive
notice, warning them that they will be subject to U.S. jurisdiction
if they engage in terrorism and injure or murder an American.194
This was a major focus of the statute, because Congress wanted
to ensure that foreign defendants could be held accountable for
their involvement in foreign terrorist attacks.195 Subsequent case
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law has interpreted the statute to apply to secondary foreign
sponsors of terrorism, as well.196 Hence, § 2333(a) cases present a
markedly different set of facts than were present in Daimler.
CONCLUSION
American citizens should continue to have the opportunity to
bring civil actions in federal courts against those that contribute
to heinous acts of international terrorism that injure or kill
Americans abroad. This was the stated legislative purpose of
§ 2333(a), to compensate injured Americans and send a message
to terrorist organizations that American citizens can and will
civilly pursue terrorist assets.
Americans can continue
exercising this right if the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Daimler is not applied to these sensitive and narrow
group of cases.
The Court in Daimler was not thinking about § 2333(a) cases
when it constructed its restrictive “at-home” test. Carving out an
exception for § 2333(a) defendants will keep Daimler’s at-home
standard good law, while concurrently avoiding unfairness to
American victims of terrorism. Instead, plaintiffs should only
have to prove general jurisdiction over § 2333(a) defendants
pursuant to International Shoe. In doing so, the Court will allow
American citizens to have their day in court, while still providing
foreign organizations notice as to where they may be amenable to
suit.
Terrorism has become an unavoidable part of our lives,
especially in the modern society where international terrorism is
growing at a faster rate than the world has ever seen before.
History is the best indicator that terrorism can happen at any
moment to anyone. Unfortunately, American citizens have
limited individual recourse in fighting terrorism. The courts
should not strip tools provided to the American people by
Congress to combat it.
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